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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the informational content and the usefulness of financial groups' liquidity 
risk public financial disclosure. This theme is of interest since the factors that influence the level 
of liquidity risk are complex, and they strongly interact with other originating factors from related 
financial risks. These characteristics have made it more difficult for financial services industry 
regulators and private sector ERM experts to recommend a practical and well defined framework 
for the management and subsequent public disclosure of liquidity risk financial information. The 
results of the study are based on an in-depth content analysis of the Annual reports (2004) 
published by twenty-one of Western Europe's largest financial groups using the liquidity risk 
management factors proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and its Joint 
Forum (2003, 2006). The results of the study revealed a disparity between commercial banks from 
the same or different European countries as to the level and extent of liquidity risk public financial 
disclosure. The same was also found for the description of the risk management structures and the 
accompanying explanatory comments on liquidity risk management practices. In addition, the 
study documented the overall scarcity of quantitative data which supports qualitative discussions 
on liquidity risk management. There were also areas of more complete financial disclosure that 
apply to factors explaining the origins of cash flows, and the explanations and discussion about 
foreign exchange risk management. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
his paper examines the informational content and the usefulness of financial groups' liquidity risk 
public financial disclosure. This theme is of interest since the factors that influence the level of 
liquidity risk are complex, and they strongly interact with other originating factors from related 
financial risks. These characteristics have made it more difficult for financial services industry regulators and private 
sector ERM experts to recommend a practical and well defined framework for the management and subsequent 
public disclosure of liquidity risk financial information. Lopez (2003), and more recently, Kwan (2006) explained 
the ongoing international efforts to improve the regulation and supervision of financial institutions to reflect 
advances in financial risk management techniques. Their analysis supports the view that improved public disclosures 
regarding conditions, operations, performance and risk management information lead to increased transparency and 
should foster more effective market discipline. 
 
The evolution of financial disclosure in the banking, insurance and securities sectors has been described in 
a study published by the Joint Forum (2004) of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The BCBS, 
the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) and the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) established, through the Joint Forum, a Working Group on enhanced disclosure. This paper 
will also examine the results of a recent review by the Joint Forum's working group (2006) of funding liquidity risk 
T 
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management practices at conglomerates engaged in banking, securities, and insurance activities. The results 
presented in this study are based on an in-depth content analysis of the 2004 annual reports published by twenty-one 
of Western Europe's largest financial groups using the liquidity risk management factors proposed over time by the 
BCBS and its Joint Forum (2003, 2004 and 2006). 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Agency theory is presented in section two. Section two also 
defines and examines the key liquidity risk management factors. An important distinction is made between a 
financial group's funding liquidity risk and its market liquidity risk. The third section describes the research 
methods, the financial group sample data, and formulates hypotheses on the extent and quality of financial groups' 
qualitative and quantitative disclosures of liquidity risk management information. Section four presents and 
discusses the study's empirical results. Finally, the conclusions, limits of the study and suggestions for further 
research are drawn in the fifth section. 
 
2. IMPROVED LIQUIDITY RISK FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 
 
Gardner et al. (2005) discuss how Agency Theory, a positive view of managerial decision making helps 
explain how risk management decisions are actually made by financial institution managers rather than prescribing 
how they should be made. In their view, Agency Theory implies that financial institutions' managers set financial 
risk management objectives and determine estimates of potential losses that could result from their business 
activities. While owners and their delegated monitors (regulators, credit rating agencies, financial analysts…) 
protect their interests by setting appropriate risk management constraints and financial disclosure standards and 
requirements. 
 
Recently, several authors have examined if improved financial risk information disclosures lead to 
increased transparency and more effective market discipline. In his study of VaR disclosures, Jorion (2002) found 
that VaR numbers in quarterly and annual reports from 1995 to 2000, of eight publicly traded U.S. commercial 
banks provided reasonable predictions of the subsequent variability of their trading revenues. 
 
Hirtle (2003) found that the market risk minimum capital adequacy requirement measure reported by 
commercial banks is informative of the level of market risk associated with the trading activities of U.S. commercial 
banks. In still another study, Liu, Ryan and Tan (2004) reported that the VaR measure also had an informational 
content about the systematic risk and the total risk encountered by U.S. commercial banks. Préfontaine et al. (2006a) 
recently presented comparable results on Canadian banks' VaR disclosures. In another area of financial risk 
management; that is, non-trading interest rate risk management, Lopez (2004) documents the usefulness of financial 
institutions' disclosures. The results of several empirical tests support the view that the disclosure of non-trading 
interest rate risk metrics like Earnings-at-Risk and Economic Value of Equity-at-Risk represents useful information 
to market participants. This last conclusion applies to U.S. banks according to Lopez (2004) and to large U.S. and 
Canadian commercial banks studied by Préfontaine et al. (2006b). 
 
Some of the earlier work by the BCBS discussed the role of information in effective market discipline and 
effective supervision. It established that financial institution transparency would be enhanced by public disclosure 
and supervisory information that promote safety and soundness. The BCBS (2000) study outlined a set of sound 
practices for managing liquidity in banking organisations. This updated guidance was organised around a set of 
fourteen principles falling into the following eight key liquidity management areas: developing a structure for 
managing liquidity, measuring and monitoring net funding requirements, managing market access, contingency 
planning, foreign currency liquidity management, internal controls for liquidity risk management, role of public 
disclosure improving liquidity and role of supervisors. 
 
During the same time period, the Working Group (Joint Forum) formulated and recommended disclosure 
practices regarding financial risks. The universe of financial intermediaries to which the recommendations were 
intended consists of banks, securities firms, insurance companies and hedge funds. The Working Group believed 
that these financial intermediaries, regulated and unregulated, should periodically disclose both qualitative and 
quantitative financial information, when material, in a way that in the firm's judgement most meaningfully expresses 
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its exposures to financial risks. The Working Group (2001) specifically made the recommendations to disclose: 
"substantive qualitative discussion of funding liquidity risk that includes some quantitative information supporting 
the discussion." The Working Group also recommended that disclosures be made which cover two important aspects 
of liquidity management: funding liquidity risk and market liquidity risk. 
 
More recently, the BCBS (2003) published a report providing an overview of the disclosure practices of a 
sample of internationally active banks. The survey focussed on the year 2001 annual reports of 54 banks 
headquartered in the Committee's member countries. The survey included 104 questions addressing quantitative and 
qualitative disclosures in twelve different categories. In general terms, the survey revealed that many banks have 
continued to expand the extent of their disclosures. Overall, in book year 2001, banks disclosed 63% of the items, 
104 questions, included in the survey, up from 59% in 2000 and 57% in 1999. In the main findings of its study, the 
BCBS (2003) noted: "The most noteworthy improvement is the increase in the disclosure of information on other 
risks (operational and legal risks, liquidity risk and interest rate risk in the banking book)". It added that this 
information has now become as commonly disclosed as the basic information on market risk or credit risk. It also 
reported that: "85% of the banks disclosed quantitative and qualitative information and strategies for managing 
liquidity risk in their year 2001 annual reports, up from 78% in 2000 and 63% in 1999". We believe that the BCBS 
findings reported above on liquidity risk management financial disclosures can only be considered to be preliminary. 
This belief is based on the fact that only one out of a possible 104 questions in the three successive disclosure 
surveys, 1999-2000-2001, directly addressed the liquidity risk management category. Furthermore, the survey 
results in this case only represent the number of affirmative answers to the presence of "disclosed quantitative and 
qualitative information and strategies for managing liquidity risk". For instance, the number of affirmative answers 
to the single liquidity disclosure question was 46 (banks) out of a possible 54 banks in 2001; thus, a disclosure rate 
of 85%. 
 
To assess the extent to which its previous recommendations were adopted, the BCBS and its Joint Forum 
(2004) reviewed the 2002 annual reports of 66 financial institutions from 12 countries in the banking, insurance and 
securities sectors. In addition to surveying public disclosures, the Working Group held meetings with representatives 
from the investment community, credit rating agencies and financial firms in order to gain their views in the degree 
of adoption of its previous recommendations and ways to improve public disclosures. The Working Group found 
that disclosure related to funding liquidity risk is a very complex issue, due primarily to the difficulty of quantifying 
the level of the risk in a way that is meaningful for disclosure purposes as well as the firm's sensitivity that such 
disclosures must be carefully considered in order not to provide misleading and potentially damaging information. 
Of more importance to the focus of this study, was the fact that with few exceptions, most of the firms surveyed 
included a discussion of funding liquidity in their annual reports. However, the extent of quantitative information 
supporting the discussion is generally weak. Members of the Joint Forum stated that improvement in quantitative 
disclosures with regard to funding liquidity risk was clearly needed. Although they believed that the way to do this 
effectively remained a challenge. The Working Group also reviewed disclosure areas requiring further investigation 
and development from a conceptual point of view. The Working Group agreed that further work in three of these 
areas should be pursued: disclosures of risk concentrations, potential future exposure and funding liquidity risk. It 
felt that the goal should be to find a way for financial firms to disclose in a meaningful way information they already 
possess as part as their internal risk management processes. The last paper we review was presented by the BCBS 
and its Joint Forum (2006), it presented the results of a review of funding liquidity risk management practices
1
 at 
conglomerates engaged in banking, securities and insurance activities. The review focussed on 40 large, complex 
financial groups with operations spanning national borders, financial sectors and currencies. The majority of the 
financial institutions represented in the review were involved in at least two of the banking, securities, or insurance 
sectors. All observations were based on information and opinions provided by the firms through written responses to 
a survey, interviews and presentations to the Working Group. The review was designed to address five key 
questions: 
                                                 
1 "Funding liquidity risk is the risk that the firm will not be able to efficiently meet both expected and unexpected current and 
future cash flow and collateral needs without affecting either daily operations or the financial condition of the firm. It differs 
from market liquidity risk, which is the risk that a firm cannot easily offset or eliminate a position without significantly affecting 
the market price because of inadequate market depth or market disruption." As the Working Group observes, in many cases, the 
same factors may trigger both types of liquidity risk. 
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- How large, complex banking, securities and insurance groups manage liquidity risks across jurisdictions, 
sectors, and subsidiary units, particularly in times of stress; 
- The impact of regulatory and supervisory approaches on liquidity risk management practices and structures; 
- The nature of the products and activities that give rise to significant demands for liquidity; 
- Assumptions that firms make regarding available sources of liquidity; and 
- The scale of liquidity shocks that firms are prepared to address.  
 
The Working Group reviewed the extent to which financial groups integrate liquidity risk management 
across sectors. Firms in each of the three sectors, banking and insurance as well as securities, monitor and manage 
liquidity risk primarily through the use of risk limits, monitoring systems, and scenario analyses that are 
incorporated into contingency funding plans (CFPs). However, given differences in business lines and funding mix, 
liquidity risk management is mostly separated in financial groups that contain firms operating in multiple sectors. 
 
Previous empirical work has demonstrated the importance and complexity of financial institutions' liquidity 
risk financial disclosure. There appears to be a wide consensus that further work in the area of managing and 
reporting liquidity risk should be pursued. In doing so, the two following aspects of liquidity risk have to be 
considered: funding liquidity risk and market liquidity risk. Further empirical work benefits from updated guidance 
organized around a set of principles falling into several liquidity management areas. Financial institutions' quarterly 
and annual reports represent important and low-cost sources of financial disclosure to all of their stakeholders. 
Liquidity risk financial information should embody substantive qualitative disclosures that include some quantitative 
information supplementing the discussion. 
 
3. EXAMINING THE EXTENT OF LIQUIDITY RISK FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 
 
  The objective of this paper is to examine the informational content and the usefulness of financial groups' 
liquidity risk public financial disclosure. The results of the analysis will be based on an in-depth content analysis of 
the annual reports (year 2004) published by twenty-one of Western Europe's largest financial groups using ten key 
liquidity risk management factors proposed by the BCBS and its Joint Forum (2003, 2006). 
 
The Results Of The Analysis Will Attempt To Answer The Following Four Questions: 
 
 Question 1: Does the extent of liquidity risk financial disclosure differ across the 21 large financial groups 
composing the study sample? 
 
 Question 2: Does the extent of liquidity risk financial disclosure differ across the 10 key liquidity risk 
management factors used in the analysis? 
 
 Question 3: Does the extent of liquidity risk financial disclosure differ across the 9 home countries of the 
21 large financial groups composing the sample? 
 
 Question 4: Does the extent of liquidity risk financial disclosure differ across the credit rating of each of the 
21 large financial groups composing the study sample? 
 
Large Financial Group Sample Description 
 
  The sample which is composed of twenty-one of Western Europe's largest financial groups was drawn from 
the Euromoney Magazine July 2005 financial groups classification. Table 1 in the text lists the financial groups by 
country of origin, and provides the value of each group's shareholders' equity, total assets as well as its Moody's long 
term bond credit rating. Nineteen of the twenty-one financial groups were also included in the 2001 disclosure 
survey by the BCBS (2003); moreover, thirteen of these were also included in the BCBS and its Joint Forum (2004) 
study of financial disclosure issues and analysis. 
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Table 1 
Sample Of Western European Financial Groups 
 
Country 
Financial 
Group 
Sh. Equity 
(M $ U.S.) 
Total Assets 
(M $ U.S.) 
Moody's 
Cr. Rating 
U.K. 
HSBC Holdings 99,817 1,276,778 Aa2 
Royal Bank of Scot. 68,768 1,124,108 Aa1 
Barclays 47,098 1,005,857 Aa1 
HBOS 39,563 853,255 Aa2 
Lloyds TSB Gr. 20,370 539,146 Aaa 
France 
Groupe Cr. Agr. 67,621 1,245,213 Aa2 
BNP Paribas 48,825 1,236,062 Aa2 
Soc. Générale 31,400 820,126 Aa3 
Gr. Caisse Ép. 25,544 742,112 Aa2 
Spain 
Santander 65,187 785,073 Aa3 
Banco B.V.A. 35,089 424,427 Aa2 
Germany Deutsche Bank 35,343 1,146,189 Aa3 
Switzerland 
Cr. Suisse Gr. 37,521 962,952 Aa3 
UBS 35,630 1,533,306 Aa2 
Netherlands 
Rabo Bank Ned. 33,452 648,211 Aaa 
ABN AMRO Gr. 27,834 830,405 Aa3 
ING Group 21,736 841,117 Aa2 
Italy 
Banca Intesa 22,200 374,552 A1 
Unicredito It. 20,684 362,626 Aa2 
Belgium KBC Group 17,645 314,678 Aa3 
Denmark Nordea 17,127 376,629 Aa3 
Source: Euromoney Magazine, July 2005. 
 
 
Key Liquidity Risk Management Factors 
 
  The results of the study are based on an in-depth content analysis of the annual reports, book-year 2004, 
published by twenty-one of Western Europe's largest financial groups using ten key liquidity risk factors proposed 
by the BCBS and its Joint Forum (2000, 2003, 2006). These key liquidity risk management factors are listed next in 
Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2 
Key Liquidity Risk Management Factors (KLF) 
 
KLF 1: Developing a Structure for Managing Liquidity 
KLF 2: Measuring and Monitoring Net Funding Requirements 
KLF 3: Managing Market Access 
KLF 4: Contingency Planning 
KLF 5: Foreign Currency Liquidity Management 
KLF 6: Internal Controls for Liquidity Management 
KLF 7: Role of Public Disclosure in Improving Liquidity 
KLF 8: Role of Supervisors 
KLF 9: 
Coverage of the Four Origins of Cash Flows: Assets, Liabilities, Off-Balance-Sheet Activities, Sources 
and Uses of Funds, Other 
KLF 10: Distinction Between Funding Liquidity Risk and Market Liquidity Risk 
 
 
Each key liquidity risk management factor (KLF) will reveive a score of 1, 2 or 3 based on the extent and 
quality of its "Qualitative discussion" of this factor. That is, a less substantive qualitative discussion scores 1, a 
substantive qualitative discussion scores 2, a more substantive qualitative discussion scores 3 which is the highest 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – July 2008 Volume 7, Number 7 
52 
score. Similarly, each key liquidity risk management factor (KLF) will receive a score of 1 , 2 or 3 depending on the 
extent and quality of its "Quantitative information" supporting the "Qualitative discussion" of this factor. That is, 
less substantive quantitative information scores 1, substantive quantitative information scores 2, more substantive 
quantitative information scores 3 which is the highest score. It follows that each key liquidity risk management 
factor (KLF) can be attributed a maximum score of 6; that is, 3 for the quality and extent of the qualitative 
discussion and another 3 for the quality and extent of the quantitative information supporting the qualitative 
discussion. Il also follows that each financial group can receive a maximum score of 60 since ten KLFs are used and 
each can be scored a maximum of six. Once the analysis is completed and scored for all ten KLFs and all twenty-
one financial groups, quantitative comparisons will be made between financial groups, countries of origin, key 
liquidity factors, and credit ratings. 
 
4. THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The purpose of this section is to present and more closely examine the empirical results on the 
informational content and the usefulness of financial groups' liquidity risk public financial disclosure. The results of 
the analysis will be presented in four parts each of which addressing one of the four previously formulated research 
questions. 
 
4.1 Liquidity Risk Financial Disclosure Differences Between Financial Groups 
 
 
Table 3 
Key Liquidity Risk Management Factors (KLF) Scores* 
 
Financial 
Group 
KLF 
1 
KLF 
2 
KLF 
3 
KLF 
4 
KLF 
5 
KLF 
6 
KLF 
7 
KLF 
8 
KLF 
9 
KLF 
10 
TOTAL 
/60 
HSBC Holdings 3,1 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,3 2,1 3,1 3,1 3,3 3,2 40 
Royal Bk. Scot. 2,1 2,1 1,1 2,1 3,3 1,1 2,2 3,3 2,3 3,2 39 
Barclays 3,1 3,3 1,1 3,1 1,2 3,1 2,1 2,1 2,3 3,1 38 
HBOS 2,1 2,2 2,1 2,1 2,2 3,1 2,1 3,1 2,2 3,2 37 
Lloyds TSB Gr. 1,1 3,2 2,3 2,1 2,3 2,1 2,2 2,2 2,3 2,3 41 
Groupe Cr. Agr. 3,3 3,3 2,1 1,1 2,2 2,1 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2 36 
BNP Paribas 2,1 2,2 2,1 1,1 2,1 2,1 1,1 2,2 2,2 2,2 32 
Soc. Générale 1,1 2,2 2,2 1,1 2,2 1,1 1,1 2,3 2,2 2,1 32 
Gr. Caisse. Ép. 3,2 2,3 3,3 1,1 3,2 3,1 2,1 3,2 2,1 3,1 42 
Santander 2,2 3,2 2,1 3,1 2,3 1,1 1,1 1,1 2,2 2,1 34 
Banco B.V.A. 2,1 2,2 2,1 2,1 3,3 1,1 2,1 1,1 2,2 2,2 34 
Deutsche Bank 3,1 2,1 1,1 3,3 2,2 2,1 1,1 3,1 2,2 3,2 37 
Cr. Suisse Gr. 2,1 1,2 2,1 2,1 2,2 1,1 3,1 2,3 2,2 2,1 34 
UBS 1,2 2,2 1,1 2,1 2,2 1,1 2,1 2,3 3,3 2,1 35 
Rabo Bank Ned. 2,1 2,2 2,1 1,2 2,2 1,1 1,1 2,2 1,2 1,1 30 
ABN Amro Gr. 3,2 1,1 2,1 2,1 2,2 1,1 1,1 2,1 2,2 1,1 30 
ING Group 3,1 1,1 2,1 2,1 2,2 1,1 1,1 1,1 3,3 3,1 32 
Banca Intensa 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,1 1,1 2,1 2,2 1,1 2,2 2,1 31 
Unicredito It. 3,1 2,2 3,3 1,1 2,2 3,1 1,1 2,1 2,2 1,1 35 
KBC Group 3,1 2,1 3,3 2,1 3,2 2,1 1,1 1,1 2,2 1,1 34 
Nordea 2,2 3,3 1,1 2,2 2,2 1,1 1,1 1,1 3,2 1,1 33 
TOTAL 76 83 70 64 89 57 57 74 91 74  
 
 
 
     
* The first score evaluates the extent and quality of the qualitative discussion of the factor. The second score evaluates the 
quantitative information supporting the quantitative discussion of the same factor. 
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As can be seen in table 3 on KLF total scores, there were marked differences between financial groups. 
Financial groups that made the most extensive qualitative and quantitative liquidity risk financial disclosures 
included: Groupe Caisse d'Épargne (42) Lloyds TSB Group (41) and HSBC Holdings (40). Conversely, the financial 
groups that made the least extensive qualitative and quantitative liquidity risk financial disclosures include: Rabo 
Bank Ned. (30), ABN AMRO Group (30) and Banca Intensa (31). Note also in Table 3 that the financial groups that 
made the most extensive disclosures did so across most of the 10 KLF disclosure areas. In addition, the financial 
groups that made the least extensive disclosures did so across most of the 10 KLF disclosure areas. The results also 
show that most financial groups scored relatively higher on KLF qualitative factors as opposed to quantitative ones, 
this point is more clearly illustrated in table 4 which shows that average qualitative scores were higher than average 
quantitative scores for eight out of the ten KLF factors. In addition, the average of qualitative scores over all ten 
KLF factors was 1.97 over 3.0 which is substantially higher than 1.54 the average of quantitative scores over 3.0. 
 
 
Table 4 
Klf Average Qualitative And Quantitative Scores 
 
 
KLF 
1 
KLF 
2 
KLF 
3 
KLF 
4 
KLF 
5 
KLF 
6 
KLF 
7 
KLF 
8 
KLF 
9 
KLF 
10 
KLF 
AVG. 
Total 76 83 70 64 89 57 57 74 91 74 73,5 
Avg. 
Qual. 
Score 
2,29 2,10 1,90 1,86 2,10 1,71 1,57 1,90 2,14 2,10 1,97 
Avg. 
Quant. 
Score 
1,33 1,86 1,43 1,19 2,14 1,00 1,14 1,67 2,19 1,43 1,54 
Avg. 
Total 
Score 
           
3,62 3,95 3,33 3,05 4,24 2,71 2,71 3,57 4,33 3,52 3,50 
 
 
4.2 Liquidity Risk Financial Disclosure Differences Between The Ten Key Liquidity Factors 
 
As can be seen in table 3, measuring and monitoring net funding requirements (KLF 2) and foreign 
currency liquidity management (KLF 5) as well as coverage of the four origins of cash flows (KLF 9) presented the 
most complete qualitative discussions and the most substantive quantitative illustrations. The results also show that 
the level and extent of financial disclosure was about average for KLF1, KLF3, KLF8 and KLF10. However, the 
level and extent of financial disclosure, both qualitative and quantitative, were comparatively low for the crucial 
areas of contingency planning (KLF 4) and internal controls for liquidity management (KLF 6). Explaining and 
illustrating the role of public disclosure in improving liquidity (KLF 7) and KLF 6 both received the lowest relative 
financial disclosure scores. 
 
To provide more tangible explanations of what is meant by above peer group financial disclosure, a more 
detailed illustration is provided next using KLF 2 measuring and monitoring net funding requirements. Three 
financial groups, Barclays and Groupe Crédit Agricole and Nordea, each received the highest possible total score 
(six) since both their qualitative discussion and quantitative illustration received the highest possible score of three. 
For example, Barclays explains very clearly how it measures and projects cash flows on a daily basis, also weekly 
and monthly. Groupe Crédit Agricole explains and illustrates its cash flow modeling, as well as its use of a monthly 
liquidity coefficient. Finally, Nordea provides detailed explanations of its monthly funding gap measure, as well as 
its use of a stable net funding requirement estimation model; that is, the estimated difference between the balance of 
stable assets and stable liabilities. Similar illustrations could be provided here on all other KLFs; unfortunately this 
is not possible because of space limitation in this paper. However, all of the more detailed study results are available 
from the corresponding author upon request. 
 
4.3 Liquidity Risk Financial Disclosure Differences Between Countries 
 
 This section presents the analysis of liquidity risk financial disclosure differences between the nine Western 
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European countries included in this study. Given the heterogeneous nature of the countries of origin and their 
financial groups, the results on KLF average total score per country presented in table 5 can only be considered to be 
preliminary. Nevertheless , even preliminary results are of interest since all prior and comparable work to this study 
published by the BCBS and its Joint Forum on financial disclosure have never revealed before individual financial 
group disclosure performance or individual country disclosure performance. Given these limitations, the results 
indicate that the level and extent of liquidity risk management financial disclosures were above peer country average 
for the United Kingdom and Germany, and below average for Italy and the Netherlands.  
 
 
Table 5 
Klf Average Total Score Per Country 
 
Country  
(# Fin. Groups) 
Rank Avg. Total Score 
Per Country /60 
U.K. (5) 1 39 
Germany (1) 2 37 
France (4) 3 35,5 
Switzerland (2) 4 34,4 
Spain (2) 5 34 
Belgium (1) 5 34 
Denmark (1) 7 33 
Italy (2) 8 32,5 
Netherlands (3) 9 30,7 
All Countries (21) - 34,4 
 
 
4.4 Liquidity Risk Financial Disclosure Differences Between Credit Rating Categories  
 
 This section presents the analysis of liquidity risk financial disclosure differences between the five credit 
rating categories attributed to the twenty-one large financial groups included in this study. Moody's long-term debt 
credit ratings were shown in Table 1 for each of twenty-one financial groups. The results presented in Table 6 on 
KLF average total score per credit rating category originate from the Table 1 information on credit ratings and the 
Table 3 information on KLF scores. 
 
 
Table 6 
KLF Average Total Score Per Credit Rating 
 
Credit Rating Category Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 
# of Fin. Groups (21) 2* 2 9 7 1 
KLF total avg. scores 35,5 38,5 35,9 33,4 30 
*For example, (Lloyds TSB Gr. (41) + Rabo Bank Ned. (30)) / 2 =  35,5 
 
 
 Even if the results reported above in Table 6 on the level and extent of liquidity risk financial disclosures 
are to be considered only as preliminary, they are nevertheless quite interesting. With only one exception, in rating 
category Aaa, the KLF total average scores were distinctly higher (lower) in higher (lower) credit rating categories. 
Based on the empirical results presented so far in this study, financial groups that have earned a higher credit rating 
category were also the institutions that made the most complete and extensive liquidity risk financial management 
disclosures. 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 This paper examined the informational content and the usefulness of financial groups' liquidity financial 
disclosure. The results of the study are based on an in-depth content analysis of the annual reports (2004) published 
by twenty-one of Europe's largest financial groups using the key liquidity risk management factors (KLF) proposed 
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by the BCBS and its Joint Forum (2003, 2006). The results of the study revealed a wide disparity in the level and 
extent of liquidity risk financial disclosures between financial groups from the same or different European countries. 
For most of the ten KLFs, the scores obtained on the level and extent of qualitative discussions were higher than 
those relating to quantitative illustrations of the same KLF. The most complete qualitative discussions and the most 
substantive quantitative illustrations were provided for the three following KLFs: measuring and monitoring net 
funding requirements (KLF2) and foreign currency liquidity management (KLF 5) as well as coverage of the origins 
of cash flows (KL9). Conversely, the level and extent of financial disclosures were found to be the least complete 
and the least substantive in the following three KLFs: contingency planning (KLF 4), internal controls for liquidity 
management (KLF 6) and explaining and illustrating the role of public disclosure in improving liquidity (KLF 7). 
Finally, the results of the study showed that financial groups that have earned a relatively high (low) credit rating 
category were also the institutions that made the most complete and extensive, both qualitative and quantitative, 
liquidity risk management financial disclosures. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Financial support from the Groupe de Recherche en Capital de Risque of the Desjardins Chair in 
Sustainable Development is gratefully acknowledged. 
 
This article is part of a research program receiving financial support from the Venture Capital Group of the 
Desjardins Chair in Sustainable Development at Université de Sherbrooke. 
 
Data Availability:  The data used in this study can be obtained from public sources. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, The Joint Forum, 2006. The Management of Liquidity Risk in 
Financial Groups. Bank for International Settlements (May). 
2. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.2004. International Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards:a Revised Framework. No. 107 (June). 
3. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, The Joint Forum, 2004. Financial Disclosure in the Banking, 
Insurance and Securities Sectors: Issues and Analysis. Bank for International Settlements (May). 
4. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 2003b. Public Disclosures by Banks: Results of the 2001 
Disclosure Survey. Basel Committee Publications No. 97 (May). 
5. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2000. Improving Public Disclosure in Banking. Staff 
Study # 173. 
6. Hirst, D.E.,P.E.Hopkins,and J.M.Wahlen. 2004. Fair Values,Income Measurement,and Bank Analysts' Risk 
and Valuation Judgments. The Accounting Review 79, pp.453-472. 
7. Hirtle,B.J. 2003. What Market Risk Capital Reporting Tells Us About Bank Risk. Economic Policy Review 
9, FRBNY, (September), pp.37-54. 
8. Jorion, P. 2002. How Informative Are Value-at-Risk Disclosures? The Accounting Review 77, pp. 911-931. 
9. Ke, B. 2004. Discussion of How Banks' VaR Disclosures Predict their Total and Priced Risk. Review of 
Accounting Studies 9 (June-September), pp. 295-299. 
10. Kwan, Simon H. 2002. Bank Security Prices and Market Discipline. FRBSF Economic Letter 2002-37 
(December 20). 
11. Kwan, Simon H. 2006. Safe and Sound Banking, 20 Years Later. FRBSF Economic letter 2006-26 
(October 6).  
12. Linsmeier, T., D. Thornton, M. Venkatachalam, and M. Welker. 2002. The effect of mandated market risk 
disclosure on trading volume sensitivity to interest rate, exchange rate, and commodity price movements. 
The Accounting Review 77 (April): 343-378. 
13. Liu, C.C., Ryan, S.G., Tan, H. 2004. How Banks' VaR Disclosures Predict their Total and Priced Risk. 
Review of Accounting Studies 9 (June-September), pp. 265-294. 
14. Lopez, Jose A. 2004. Supervising Interest Rate Risk Management. FRBSF Economic Letter 2004-26 
(September 17). 
15. Lopez, Jose A. 2003. Disclosure as a Supervisory Tool: Pillar 3 of Basel II. FRBSF Economic Letter 2003-
22 (August 1). 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – July 2008 Volume 7, Number 7 
56 
16. Préfontaine, J., Desrochers, J., Kadmiri, O. 2006a How Informative Are Banks' Earnings-at-Risk and 
Economic Value of Equity-at-Risk Public Disclosures? Insurance and Risk Management, vol. 74 (1), April, 
1-19. 
17. Préfontaine, J., Houde, D., Desrochers, J., Martel, D. 2006b. The Informational Content of the VaR 
Measures Associated with the Trading Activities of Canadian Banks. IBER conference, Las Vegas Nevada, 
October 2006, Best paper award, to be published in 2007 in the Journal of Business and Economics 
Research. 
18. Sierra, G. E., Yeager, T. J. 2004. What Does The Federal Reserve's Economic Value Model Tell Us About 
Interest Rate Risk at U.S. Community Banks? Review 86, FRBSL (Nov./Dec.), pp. 45-60. 
 
 
NOTES 
